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Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis
Jasper Feyaerts* and Stijn Vanheule
Department of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Consulting, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
In the present essay, we aim to develop and contrast three different positions toward
Sellars’ distinction between the manifest and scientific images of man: Dennett’s
philosophical reconstruction of neurocognitive science, contemporary phenomenology
and psychoanalysis. We will suggest that these respective traditions and the substantial
differences between them can be understood in terms of a ‘logic of appearance.’
Related to this are differing ideas about the rights and limits of the first-person
perspective, the relation between conscious experience and belief, and the issue of
naturalization. In the final part, we will try to specify, on the basis of a detailed reading
of the disagreement between Dennett and phenomenology, in what way psychoanalytic
theory could respond to these different issues.
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INTRODUCTION
In his Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, Wilfrid Sellars offered a condensed diagnosis
that seems to retain a certain validity with respect to our current philosophical, scientific and
social predicament. Sellars (1991) famously talked about a discord fueled by the conflict between
two apparently opposing “images” of man-in-the-world (1991, p.5): on the one hand, a manifest
image which represents the tentative and provisional collection of ideas and assumptions we
spontaneously adopt to characterize ourselves and the world we live in. Chief among these are ideas
closely related to our immediate self-understanding as subjects endowed with self-consciousness,
a certain extent of freedom of choice, gifted with reason but also desires, and so on. On the other
hand, a relatively recent, but continually expanding scientific image of man as a “complex physical
system” (1991, p. 25) – that is, an image conspicuously unlike its manifest double, but one which
can be progressively distilled from various burgeoning scientific disciplines, such as neurology,
physics, evolutionary biology and cognitive science.
In a more recent past, Sellars’ distinction has found a renowned application in the work of
the well-known philosopher of cognitive neuroscience, Daniel Dennett. For the past few decades,
Dennett has been vehemently advocating against “the fantasy of first-person science” (Dennett,
2001), arguing, amongst other things, that there is no such thing as a ‘Cartesian theater’ where
private things happen that are spontaneously revealed before a ‘mental I/eye’, one that, moreover,
would form an unsurpassable source for self-knowledge from a first-person perspective. Why
indeed, Dennett asks, should we give up our scientific abstinence when, compared to some
other notorious fictive entities such as the phlogiston or élan vital, it comes to seemingly less
exotic matters such as the ‘I’, ‘experience’ and ‘consciousness’? According to Dennett’s well-known
proposal, we should treat these manifest testimonies in the same way we treat testimonies in
court, that is, as provisional fictions (Dennett, 1991, p. 79), where after we can safely let cognitive
neuroscience do its job in deciding if, and to what extent, there might be “truth in fiction.”
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Given the central importance of the first-person perspective –
in one way or another, and to be specified throughout our article –
in both contemporary phenomenology and psychoanalytic
theory, the questions we want to pose in this article are therefore
the following ones: where do these disciplines, respectively, stand
with regard to such proposals? And in what way would these two
disciplines respond to Dennett’s proposal to consider subjective
beliefs about ourselves as provisional fictions and, to be sure, in
all likelihood, future illusions?
In the first part, we will give a detailed reading of what
is understood by such terms as ‘first-person experience’ and
‘subjective appearance’ in both phenomenology and Dennett’s
account and, on the basis of that reading, press some arguments
that can be advanced against Dennett’s fictionalization of
subjectivity in favor of phenomenology. In the second part, we
will offer a similar exercise in the case of psychoanalysis. We
will argue that Sellars’ distinction, exemplified by the discussion
between Dennett and phenomenology, touches upon a classic
ambiguity in psychoanalytic theory. Finally, a possible way out
of this ambiguity will be sought through a close examination of
the psychoanalytic concept of ‘belief ’.
DENNETT AND PHENOMENOLOGY: THE
SEEMING OF SEEMING
Let us take as a point of entry in the already quite extensive
debate between phenomenology and Dennett1 one of the latter’s
most cherished examples which he uses in his Consciousness
Explained in order to fortify his Multiple Drafts Model of
consciousness, a model which, Dennett warns us, “is initially
deeply counterintuitive” (1991, p. 45). Dennett refers to a certain
perceptual effect, better known in the literature as the phi
phenomenon or phi movement, first so called by the Gestalt
psychologist Max Wertheimer, which was the object of repeated
study in a series of experiments conducted by Kolers and von
Grünau (1976). In the simplest case of the experiment, subjects
were shown a single flash of a red spot, followed quickly by a
displaced green spot, followed by another flash of the original
red (each flash lasting about 150 ms, with a gap of about 50 ms
in between). Perhaps not that surprising given our everyday
smooth television-experience, the subjects reported seeing not
two discrete spots, but one spot rapidly moving over and back
again. However, one might ask, what about the change of color
from red to green? Interestingly, the subjects reported the spot
changing color about halfway through its trajectory from the
initial flash to the second. As Dennett (1991) recounts the
result: “the first spot seemed to begin moving and then change
color abruptly in the middle of its illusory passage toward the
second location” (p. 114). Given this surprising result, one of
the collaborators to the experiments, the philosopher Nelson
Goodman, asked the following question: “how are we able to fill
in the spot at the intervening place-times along a path running
from the first to the second flash before that second flash occurs”
1For a representative sample of the different discussions running through this
debate, see the collection of essays in Dreyfus and Kelly (2007).
(Goodman, 1978, p. 73)? A pressing question indeed in so far as
we want to avoid positing strange ontological scenarios wherein
effects precede their causes and time starts running backward.
So how then are we to proceed in answering Goodman’s
question? We will first begin by teasing out some basic principles
in the way phenomenology would handle this issue, in order to
articulate more clearly the dividing line which separates Dennett’s
account from the former.
The Principle of Appearance Qua
Appearance
From a phenomenological perspective, when confronted with
such an ambiguous situation, it would be wise to make use
of Husserl’s notorious maxim of phenomenological inquiry and
“to go back to the things themselves” (Husserl, 2001, p. 168).
Indeed, one of the guiding motifs and enabling assumptions
of phenomenology is that in principle, and through availing
ourselves of phenomenology’s methodological procedures of
‘epoché’ and ‘reduction’, we would be able to put these
explanatory questions aside for a moment and to focus instead
on the experienced object (in this case the moving spot) precisely
in the way it is experienced from the subjective or first person
point of view. Rather than the hasty conjuring up of various
theoretical explanations (e.g., Goodman’s “how are we able to fill
in the gaps?”), phenomenology’s traditional first move is to get
a clear descriptive picture of what is to be explained in the first
place – the quod erat explicatum for a science of consciousness -,
precisely by letting, to use Heidegger’s inimitable phrasing, “that
which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which
it shows itself from itself ” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 34). Despite the
different ways in which contemporary phenomenology aims to
fulfill its role in the debate around the nature of consciousness,
there is indeed at least one unifying principle amongst the
various phenomenological commentators. Let us call this the
phenomenological principle of appearance qua appearance. In
order to get a clear view of the sort of claims at stake in
such a principle, let us begin by considering a few remarks by
Husserl. In the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, Husserl (1970) writes:
The first thing we must do, and first of all in immediate
reflective self-experience, is to take conscious life, completely
without prejudice, just as what it quite immediately gives itself,
as itself, to be (p. 233).
Here we have the first point: if anything, phenomenology, as a
transcendental investigation of the first-person perspective, takes
its point of departure “in immediate self-experience”, that is, it
tries to offer a descriptive analysis of the way the world in general
(Wertheimian spotlights included), but also other subjects and
we ourselves, appear to us in ordinary experience. Crucially,
in offering such a description of our everyday intentional
involvement with the world, this appearance should be accepted
“just as what it quite immediately gives itself, as itself, to be”
(Husserl, 1970, p. 233). In short: on a phenomenological account,
appearance should be taken as appearance as such, rather than as
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something else. Let us take one of Husserl’s examples to clarify
and develop the ramifications of such an idea a little bit further.
Suppose we walk through a garden and become struck
by a blossoming tree. How do we go about analyzing our
immediate experience of the appearing of this blossoming
tree? It is here that Husserl’s methodological tool of ‘epoché’
comes into play; a notion, however, particularly fraught with
all kinds of misunderstandings we need to clear up before
furthering our analysis (see Overgaard, 2015). According to a
common misunderstanding, for example, the method of epoché
or ‘bracketing’ would lead us to a consideration of the immanent
contents of perception as they show up ‘in’ consciousness,
severed and disconnected from any possible relation to the
transcendent, real world which, conversely, is considered to
be ‘outside’ consciousness (e.g., Burge, 2010). Accordingly,
phenomenological bracketing would be first of all the bracketing
of the realist presumption inherent in the natural attitude of
our everyday experience. That is, the elimination of our pre-
philosophical belief in the real world in favor of the appearance
of Husserl’s blossoming tree as some kind of second blossoming
tree, this time considered as an immaterial entity (i.e., image,
datum, perceptum, . . .) somehow hovering before or within
consciousness as in a Dennettian Cartesian theater. Yet closer
inspection of some of Husserl’s own remarks on what the
epoché is supposed to accomplish makes it clear that such an
introspective reading is simply mistaken. Remarking on how that
blossoming tree appears to consciousness after the epoché has
been performed, Husserl (1983) writes
[. . .] everything remains as of old. Even the
phenomenologically reduced perceptual mental process
is a perceiving of “this blossoming apple tree, in this garden,”
etc., and, likewise, the reduced liking is a liking of this same
thing. The tree has not lost the least nuance of all these
moments, qualities, characteristics with which it was appearing
in this perception, <with which > it < was appearing
as > “lovely,” “attractive,” and so forth “in” this liking (p. 216).
Hence, the practice of phenomenological bracketing as
originally intended by Husserl does not consist in a reflexive
retreat from reality the better to focus on contents or
‘qualia’ that are found within the self-enclosed terrain of
pure consciousness. Nevertheless, although everything after
the epoché “remains as of old” (Husserl, 1983, p. 216),
there is of course a sense in which the epoché, in Husserl’s
understanding, does reveal something that might have gone
unnoticed before we put it to use. Again, Husserl (1970)
remarks:
[...] through the epoché a new way of experiencing, of thinking,
of theorizing, is opened to the philosopher; here, situated
above his own natural being and above the natural world, he
loses nothing of their being and objective truths and likewise
nothing at all of the spiritual acquisitions of his world-life (...);
he simply forbids himself – as a philosopher [...] – to continue
the whole natural performance of his world-life (p. 152).
Two points are important in this rendition of the epoché.
The first thing to emphasize is that this new way of
experiencing is not a matter of acquiring additional empirical
information through further forms of experience, for example,
by turning my introspective gaze from the world to my
consciousness. This means that, with regard to the earlier
example of Husserl’s blossoming tree, the epoché is intended
to enable a faithful attending and description of the original
experience of the blossoming tree precisely as it appeared in
that very experience, that is, without changing anything about
all the moments and elements that were already implicit in
that experience. So if in our straightforward experience of the
blossoming tree, it appeared as ‘actually existing’ or ‘real’, mind
independent in whatever sense, but also ‘lovely’, ‘attractive’, ‘in this
garden’ and so forth, then these presuppositions, and basically
all positions with regard to that tree, should be retained in our
description.
Yet, secondly, in this reflexive elucidation of conscious
experience through the epoché, not only does the focus shift from
world to world-as-experienced, but so does the criterion for truth
and error with regard to phenomenological statements that try to
express descriptively what was going on according to experience.
That is, by abstaining from taking any positions toward the
conscious experience of, for example, spotlights changing color
at a certain moment, we seem to be moving to what is at least
a different sort of epistemological terrain when compared to
the epistemic situation of empirical claims about the world (see
Rosenberg, 2002). Yet, we should be careful as to the precise
nature of the epistemic shift that, according to phenomenology,
is at stake here.
Does such a claim, for example, imply some sort of “papal
infallibility” (Dennett, 2007, p. 6) or incorrigibility with regard to
phenomenological beliefs relative to the first-person perspective?
Here is how Koch (1997) formulates such an idea:
We shall take the cogito only as a means of suspending
objectivity claims and of thereby inducing infallibility in what
remains of the objectivity claim after suspension. This last
point is important. For every objective truth claim, in which
I am invariably fallible, there is a corresponding trivial truth
claim, in which I am infallible, a truth claim which is fulfilled by
the sheer fact that I seriously and honestly claim so. For every
objective, thick truth claim, that p, there is a corresponding
trivial, thin truth claim, that I think that p (or that it seems
to me that p) (p. 73).
Hence, on Koch’s reading (but also Dennett’s, cf. infra), the
epoché entails a movement from objectivity claims in which I am
invariably fallible, e.g., the explicit judgment ‘the spot changes
color about halfway its trajectory’, to a suspension of the same
objectivity claim for which in that case I become infallible,
‘it seems to me that the spot changes color about halfway its
trajectory’. Moreover, the reason why such a transition from
judgment to suspension implies infallibility is because in this case,
according to Koch, the cogito “falls within its own scope” (1999,
p. 72). What this means is that the cogito, represented by the
expression ‘I think that p’ or ‘it seems to me that p’, cannot be
iterated without becoming trivial since an additional deployment
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of the epoché would add no further relevant information beyond
what can already be found after the first suspension: ‘I think that
p’ is logically equivalent to ‘I think that I think that p’ or ‘it seems
to me that it seems to me that p’.
However, it is highly questionable whether Husserl and
other major figures in the phenomenological tradition would
apprehend the outcome of the epoché and the suggested
first-person incorrigibility in such an intellectualistic and
Cartesian way. Here, the question is: should we understand
the phenomenological transition from world to world-
as-experienced as a suspension from objectivity claims to
subjectivity claims in terms of a regression to the ‘I think’ of
the Cartesian cogito? Husserl (1970), for one, does not seem to
endorse this reading:
It is naturally a ludicrous, though unfortunately common
misunderstanding, to seek to attack transcendental
phenomenology as “Cartesianism”, as if its ego cogito
were a premise or set of premises from which the rest of
knowledge (. . .) was to be deduced, absolutely “secured.” The
point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it (p. 193).
What is behind Husserl’s quite explicit rejection
of understanding phenomenology as another form of
“Cartesianism”? Although much can (and has been) said
about this (see e.g., MacDonald, 2000; Staiti, 2015), in the
present context, the most important point to stress is that
Husserl’s and Descartes’ projects are driven by fundamentally
different questions. The relevant difference for our purposes
is to be found in the opposition Husserl draws in the passage
above between the Cartesian project of ‘securing’ and that of
phenomenological ‘understanding’. For Descartes, as is well
known, given the rather unlikely but still imaginable possibility
of my being deceived by a vicious demon, the crucial question
becomes that of securing some ‘fundamentum inconcussum’
(involving the two figures of the cogito and a benevolent God)
in order to ward off the skeptical threat of perpetual illusion. On
a more formal level, Cartesian hyperbolic skepticism represents
a passage from uncertainty regarding the truth of most of our
convictions regarding the world and ourselves, to certainty with
regard to the truth of believing itself (i.e., Koch’s thesis above).
How then is this different from Husserl’s description of the task
of phenomenology not to secure, but to understand objectivity?
And how is this related to the issue of first-person incorrigibility
and truth? Here is how Husserl (1989) specifies this task:
Its sole task and accomplishment is to clarify the sense of this
world, precisely the sense in which everyone accepts it – and
rightly so – as actually existing. That the world exists – that
it is given as an existing universe in uninterrupted experience
which is constantly fusing into universal concordance – is
entirely beyond doubt. But it is quite another matter to
understand this indubitability, which sustains life and positive
science, and to clarify the ground of its legitimacy (p. 420).
So, on the one hand, Husserl would basically subscribe to
Peirce’s (1992) sobering advice not to “pretend to doubt in
philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts” (1992, pp. 28–
29), thereby denying that such a radical pretense is genuinely
possible to begin with. Doubting, according to Husserl, is not
a matter of simple decision or sheer will. In order to doubt
something and to go beyond a philosophical play of mere
make-believe, I need a relevant motivation to doubt and such
motivation seems entirely lacking in the case of my experience of
reality. The world, Husserl (1995) writes, stands before our eyes
as existing “without question” (1995, p. 17); or, in Heidegger’s
(1985) words, it is there “before all belief” and never “experienced
as something which is believed any more than it is guaranteed
by knowledge” (1985, p. 216). Basically all phenomenological
authors would concur on this basic point: rather than being the
effect of what I believe it to be, my experience of reality, in its own
characteristic way of appearing, determines and makes possible
any beliefs I might form about it in turn (see also Merleau-Ponty,
2002, p. 44 et passim).
Yet this, according to Husserl, still somehow constitutes
a problem. Again, however, one should avoid precipitously
identifying this ‘problem’ with the Cartesian effort of trying
to secure the world or any of its objects through some kind
of miraculous deduction starting from the immanent sphere
of consciousness. The main reason for Husserl’s misgivings
with regard to such an effort is not so much that it is a
hopeless endeavor (although it is), but that it already betrays
one’s lack of a proper understanding of consciousness and
world-experience. That is, within this Cartesian setup, conscious
experience is already pre-understood as a matter of having
‘subjective representations’ or ‘images’ that may or may not
correspond to the object as it is in-itself standing behind the
veil of appearances, thereby opening up the skeptical challenge
of knowing whether and how knowledge can extend beyond the
prison-house of subjective-relative appearances. This conception
of consciousness as some kind of ‘bag’ or ‘container’ where
representational contents, to use Dennett’s expression, “swim
along” (1991, p. 44) is, in Husserl’s (1999) view, a “fatal mistake”
(1999, p. 35).
To give just one example of the ‘mistake’ Husserl is aiming
at: when I visually perceive, say, a chair, almost no one
(except, perhaps, some philosophers) makes the mistake of
claiming that what we are actually conscious of is some sort
of image, sense-datum or another mental representative of
the chair. According to Husserl, being conscious of the chair
through the presentational consciousness of some other chair-
like simulacrum precisely does not count as a perception of
a chair, even if this representative image somehow resembles
the original chair. This is (but one limited way) how our
ordinary experience of everyday objects immediately strikes us,
as somehow presenting us with the chair itself. Yet most of us,
Husserl included, would agree that objects don’t appear before
consciousness magically, as – in Sellars’ idiom – “a seal on melted
wax” (Sellars, 1981, p. 12): at least some sort of process is involved
that makes the presence of the object – in the way that it is
present – possible. It is precisely this possibility which Husserl,
under the heading of his transcendental-constitutive analysis,
wants to understand: not if conscious experience is involved with
the world itself rather than its ghostly double, but how it is so.
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Now the ‘fatal mistake’ – of which Descartes was in Husserl’s
eyes a paradigmatic offender – occurs when we substitute some
part of this process, i.e., that in virtue of which we are conscious
of objects in the way that we do, for our consciousness of the
object itself. In contemporary terms: when we confuse properties
of what is represented with properties of the representing. To
stick with the chair-example: as I visually perceive the chair, my
experiences change in various detectable ways. What I perceive
of the chair will, amongst other things, depend on my position
relative to it. Yet, the chair itself does not appear to get bigger
or smaller whenever I get nearer or back away from it, nor does
it appear to turn black when I switch off the light. I perceive
the chair as having one uniform color, size and shape, while the
sensations in virtue of which I perceive those qualities can, and
often must, vary with changes in my environment and condition.
However, in straightforward perception I do not attend to these
sensations, and they are not among the perceptual experience’s
object. As Husserl (2001) writes: “I do not see color-sensations,
but colored things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer’s
song” (p. 99).
Although we won’t go further in Husserl’s detailed analyses
of perceptual experience, Husserl’s notorious quarrel with
Descartes’ theory of ideas on what it is like to perceive a world
already reveals that there is nothing specifically ‘incorrigible’
about the phenomenological epoché and its turn to world-
as-experienced. So unlike Koch’s reading of Descartes, the
phenomenological version of the epoché does not entail any sort
of insularity thesis according to which first-person beliefs are
immune to error as long as they are restricted to the principle of
appearance qua appearance. Put yet another way: not how I think
the world appears, but how it actually appears is the principal
focus of phenomenological inquiry. And this is precisely what the
phenomenological epoché, on Husserl’s understanding, should
enable us to do: no more and no less than to clarify the implicit
sense of what is always already familiar and taken for granted in
straightforward experience.
Dennett’s Heterophenomenology:
Cartesianism without a Theater
We seemed to have wandered needlessly into the historical
vagaries of philosophical dispute between Husserl and Descartes
in order to shed a light on an apparently trivial example like that
of the phi-phenomenon discussed by Dennett. But, as pointed
out endlessly by Dennett himself, seeming is not always being,
and the triviality of the example stands in sharp contrast with the
wider philosophical ramifications Dennett develops on a certain
reading of the phenomenon for the very idea of consciousness
and the first-person perspective. So what about this reading?
There is indeed a much simpler and parsimonious approach
to the topic of subjective experience compared to the one we
have been offering on our reading of Husserlian phenomenology.
Dennett is a firm defender of the methodological principle that
scientific theories, especially when it comes to such a contested
field as consciousness, should avoid multiplying entities beyond
necessity (1991, p. 134). By this he means primarily that if a
certain gap should arise between how things stand in reality and
how they ‘seem’ from the first-person perspective, one should
avoid postulating what he famously calls ‘the Cartesian theater’:
i.e., some kind of inner screen where shadowy representatives of
an absent reality are henceforth really present before the inner
eye of an equally shadowy observer. Yet, as Dennett points out,
the idea dies hard and in order to dispel its seductive lure, it is not
enough to avoid explicit reference to outdated forms of dualistic
metaphysics by, for example, quickly replacing mind-talk with
brain-talk. That is, even within the now dominant terms of
neurocognitive materialism, the Cartesian specter tends to make
its unholy reappearance – under the bastard idea of ‘Cartesian
materialism’ – whenever a central point is presupposed where
everything “comes together” and various brain processes present
their final product to consciousness (Dennett and Kinsbourne,
1992, p. 185). Such an idea is pernicious in a variety of ways: on
the one hand, it usually makes for a sloppy functional analysis
of how the brain is able to perform its various capacities because
such an abstract center tends to clean up all our functional loose
ends. On the other hand, wherever there is talk of something
being finally presented to consciousness, we can be sure that the
idea of a central observer appreciating and observing this product
is never too far away. As Dennett (2007) points out with regard
to the example visual consciousness:
We are making steady progress on this subpersonal story [. . .]
and we can be confident that there will be a subpersonal story
that gets all the way from eyeballs to reports and in that
story there will not be a second presentation process with an
inner witness observing an inner screen and then composing a
report. As I never tire of saying, the work done by the imagined
homunculus has to be broken up and distributed around (in
space and time) to lesser agencies in the brain (p. 11).
This is the crux of Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model,
specifically devised as an antidote to the crippling but tenacious
legacy of the Cartesian Theater. However, what exactly does
it mean to deny the existence of this central ‘Oval Office’
and to replace it it with “various events of content fixation
occurring in various places at various times in the brain”
(Dennett, 1991, p. 365) for our overall discussion on first-
person appearance? Did we, for example, not already see how
Husserlian phenomenology left behind such a theater-conception
of consciousness quite some time ago for an externalist
understanding of consciousness as essentially world-involving?
To appreciate in what way Dennett’s proposal specifically diverges
from the phenomenological tradition, let us see how this
model works in vivo with the empirical example of the phi-
phenomenon.
In response to Goodman’s question (cf. supra) for a possible
explanation of the avowed experience of seeing the moving
spot change color before it actually occurred, Dennett considers
two possible hypotheses: an Orwellian and Stalinesque version,
respectively. That is, either we concoct false memories of having
seen the spot change color, though in fact we had no prior
immediate experience of the change (this is the post-experiential
‘Orwellian’ revision, suggesting a kind of ex post facto rewriting
of history); or else we really do have a genuine, albeit delayed,
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consciousness of the light moving continuously and changing
color, due to a kind of unconscious rapid editing process that “fills
in” the missing data and presents the finished product to the eye
of the beholder (this is the pre-experiential ‘Stalinesque’ revision,
reminiscent of the cooked-up evidence presented in communist
show trials, which does in fact make a genuine appearance in
court, despite its fraudulence). Common to both versions is the
subject’s belief in the conscious experience of the moving spot,
although they seem to differ substantially in how that belief
came about: due to false memories of a veridical experience in
the Orwellian case, and accurate memories of a non-veridical
experience in the case of the Stalinesque show trial.
Yet, in glossing over these two accounts of the phi-
phenomenon, Dennett’s ‘counterintuitive’ proposal finally reveals
its true color: according to Dennett, the intuition that one of
the explanations must be correct to the exclusion of the other
is, once again, a clear indication of our persistent captivity in
the Cartesian Theater. Postulating a difference between a real
experience above and beyond or, more properly, before or after
what subjects believe they experienced is, in Dennett’s functionalist
idiom, “a difference that makes no difference” (1991, p. 132).
Hence, in clear opposition to the phenomenological account,
the conclusion Dennett wants us to draw from the numerous
experiments discussed in his Consciousness Explained is that there
is no difference between how things seem to us and how we think
they seem. Bringing this all together, Dennett consequently dubs
his Multiple Drafts Model as a first-person operationalism “for
it brusquely denies the possibility in principle of consciousness
of a stimulus in the absence of the subject’s belief in that
consciousness” (1991, p. 132).
Needless to say, such a conception of the first-person
perspective as entirely constituted by subjective beliefs
immediately carries some remarkable consequences for the
scientific effort to devise a proper naturalistic account for
this dimension. These become most salient in Dennett’s own
methodology of choice for approaching the scientific study of
human consciousness, his heterophenomenology, advertised as
an explicitly third-person approach to the issue of subjectivity
(Dennett, 2003). On the face of it, this seems like a remarkable
thing to do: subjectivity is traditionally regarded as occupying
something rather like another dimension – the private,
‘first-person’, more or less self-consciousness sort of being –
in comparison with the privileged objects of ‘third-person’
methodologies like meteors, sound waves or bone density. This
ostensible difference between meteors and minds has led some
phenomenological authors, like e.g., Evan Thompson, to claim
that phenomenology, as an explicitly first-person investigation,
is in fact an inescapable prerogative for any naturalistic account
because “any attempt to gain a comprehensive understanding
of the human mind must at some point confront consciousness
and subjectivity – how thinking, perceiving, acting and feeling
are experienced in one’s own case” (Thompson, 2007, p. 16, our
italics; see also Gallagher, 2007). The reasoning behind such a
claim is relatively straightforward and is meant particularly as
a warning sign for Dennett’s – but also others’ – overambitious
naturalistic inclinations: any explanatory scheme which departs
so completely from first-person experience that it calls into doubt
the very existence of such experiences can no longer claim to be
elucidating that explanandum, since it has effectively ‘eliminated’
the very object it purports to be an account of. Yet Dennett is
not impressed. In an essay addressing some misunderstandings
concerning his apologia for his heterophenomenology with the
little concealing title “Who’s On First?”, Dennett asks:
Can the standard methods be extended in such a way as
to do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness?
Or do we have to find some quite radical or revolutionary
alternative science? I have defended the hypothesis that there is
a straightforward, conservative extension of objective science
that handsomely covers the ground – all the ground – of
human consciousness, doing justice to all the data without
ever having to abandon the rules and constraints of the
experimental method that have worked so well in the rest of
science (2003, p. 19).
Heterophenomenology is the method of choice whenever
one wishes to take the first person point of view seriously –
that is, as seriously as it can be taken – while keeping the
methodologically scrupulous requirements undergirding the
same objective perspective that reigns in those sciences that
aspire to explain different, but from a methodological point of
view, no more daunting phenomena such as continental drift,
biodiversity or the digestive tract. So what then, exactly, does
Dennett’s heterophenomenology commit us to? What precisely
does it mean to take subjects seriously, but not too seriously?
Return of the Cogito: Serious, All Too
Serious
Given that we have to adopt a strict third-person perspective,
since as Dennett is keen to say, “all science is constructed
from that perspective” (1991, p. 68), the only access to
the phenomenological realm will be via the observation and
interpretation of publicly observable data, including utterances
and other behavioral manifestations. Furthermore, we will have
to find a neutral way of describing these data – that is, a way
that doesn’t prejudge the issue – by adopting a special form
of heterophenomenological abstinence. Such an abstinence –
likened by Dennett to a third-person version of Husserl’s epoché
(Dennett, 2003, p. 22) – brackets the issue about whether the
subject is in fact a computer, a mere zombie, a dressed up
parrot or a real conscious being. The only thing such a third-
person epoché does commit us to is adopting what Dennett
calls the intentional stance: we should interpret the vocal sounds
emanating from the subjects’ mouths as speech acts that express
the subject’s beliefs in order to compose a text of what that subject
wants to say about his or her own conscious experiences. As
Dennett (1991) explains:
People undoubtedly do believe they have mental images, pain,
perceptual experiences and all the rest, and these facts –
the facts about what people believe, and report when they
express their beliefs – are phenomena any scientific theory of
mind must account for. We organize our data regarding these
phenomena into theorists’ fictions, “intentional objects” in
heterophenomenological worlds. Then the question of whether
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items thus portrayed exist as real objects, events, and states in
the brain – or in the soul, for that matter – is an empirical
matter to investigate (p. 98).
Again, this merely seems like a fairly trivial rehearsal of the
principle of scientific neutrality: from the fact that people believe
all kinds of things, even when these things happen to refer to
their own experience, we shouldn’t immediately conclude that
these things actually exist. As a case in point, take the example of
visual experience. People often seem to believe that their visual
experience represents the world in sharp focus, uniform detail
and high resolution from the center out to the periphery, as a
kind of snap-shot like picture of the world (Noë, 2004). Yet as
Dennett points out, convincingly, such a view of visual experience
as gap-free and wholly continuous is mistaken. Take the example
of looking at a wall: while staring at it, it looks to you as if there is
unbroken expanse of wall. However, this is not to say that it seems
to you as if, in a single saccadic fixation, the whole of the wall’s
surface is presented in equally rich detail from the center out to
the periphery, as if every part of the wall’s surface is immediately
presented to consciousness at once. Rather, as Husserl would
say, the wall is “transcendent” to my experience insofar as it
has more to it than what is revealed to me in any single phase
of experience and, moreover, is precisely given or experienced
(as opposed to inferred or deduced) as having more to it. So,
as the example illustrates, we would do well to follow Dennett’s
advice by not taking everything a subject believes about his or her
own experience at face value. On this account, taking subjects’
reports and beliefs serious means that we take into account that
they can be mistaken; if not, that is, if doubt with regard to
conscious experience would be strictly speaking senseless, then –
as Wittgenstein (1958) famously said – so too would any assertion
of knowledge (1958, p. 211).
However, despite Dennett’s repeated insistence on our
pervasive fallibility with regard to first-person experience as a
central argument for the adoption of his heterophenomenological
stance, the question is how this methodological modesty squares
with his aforementioned first-person operationalism. How to
reconcile the by all parties acknowledged fact that we can be
wrong about first-order experience with Dennett’s thoroughgoing
fictionalization of subjectivity up to the point where we have
“total, dictatorial authority over the account of how it seems to
you, about what it is like to be you” (Dennett, 1991, p 96)? To
put it in the language of Dennett’s own cherished functionalism:
is fallibility a difference that can make a difference for the
defense of heterophenomenology when there is no possibility
of consciousness in the absence of a subject’s belief in that
consciousness? It must be clear by now that it cannot, and
furthermore, that this inability to make room for a distinction
between appearance and reality within the field of conscious
appearance is itself a remarkable and, as per the defense of
heterophenomenology, undesirable consequence of what we
would call Dennett’s own doxastic Cartesianism. For if my
subjective experience is entirely constituted by what I believe to
be the case, or what I believe that seems to be the case, then there
is of course – and as we made clear in our reading of Descartes –
no ‘case’ about which I can be wrong either. Consequently,
Dennett is confronted with the following paradox:
(1) Either make room for the distinction between experience and
judgment in which case the plea for heterophenomenology can
be saved but at the cost of first-person operationalism;
(2) Or retain the latter, but at the cost of being unable
to countenance fallibility and hence of introducing an
unavoidable return to the philosophical core of Cartesianism,
although this time without a theater.
Yet secondly, apart from this general philosophical tension, a
further problem for Dennett’s doxastic account arises when we
raise the further question about how it construes the relation
between belief and experience. As we have seen, the central
strategy of Dennett’s heterophenomenology is to attribute a
belief to the subject whenever he or she reports an experience,
rather than the other way around. And indeed, it has been a
traditional argument ever since Descartes and Kant that an ‘I
think’ or ‘I believe’ accompanies, or at least in principle must
be able to accompany, any experience I might claim to be
having, for otherwise, as the famous quote from Kant (1996)
continues, “something would be represented in me that could
not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the
representation would either be impossible or else at least would
be nothing to me” (1996, B131–132). Importantly, Dennett trades
on this ineliminable occurrence of the ‘I think’ within reflective
consciousness to advance his first-person operationalism and
thus to deny the possibility that there could be any difference
between beliefs and experience. Since, as Dennett’s argument
goes, if you have conscious experiences you don’t believe you
have – those experiences would be just as inaccessible to you as to
the heterophenomenological observer. Conversely, if you believe
you have conscious experiences you don’t in fact have, it is your
beliefs that need to be explained, not the non-existent experiences
(Dennett, 2003, p. 21). Hence, the crucial question becomes: is
it really necessary for a subject while enjoying or undergoing
an experience, to immediately believe that he is enjoying or
undergoing that experience?
It is safe to say that one of the grounding motives in the
phenomenological works of most notably Sartre, Merleau-Ponty
and Heidegger is a forceful critique of this intellectualistic
idea. The claim has been that there are indeed conscious
intentional experiences that a subject could have without
immediately believing that he is having them. Even more,
those experiences precisely depend on the subject’s not having
a belief about them: if the subject were to believe he was
having the experience, instead of merely living it through, the
experience would become impossible (see also Dreyfus and Kelly,
2007). Differently put: a necessary condition for those types of
experience is precisely the absence of the Cartesian spectator.
A famous example is of course the following one by Sartre
(2004):
When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I
am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There
is consciousness of the streetcar-needing-to-be-overtaken, etc.,
and non-positional consciousness of consciousness. I am then
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plunged into the world of objects; they constitute the unity of
my consciousness, they present themselves with values, with
attractive and repellant qualities – but me, I have disappeared
(2004, p. 32).
Central to such examples is that the subject, to put it in
Lacanian terms, is ‘internally excluded’ from the experience while
living them through: in keeping an appropriate distance while
talking to people, in reaching automatically for the proffered
handshake, laughing while listening to some amusing story,
rapidly walking down the stairs or backing away from a painting
to get a better view, there is a certain solicitation from the world
to engage in various activities without us having to decide to
do so. Moreover, reflexively deciding, contemplating or believing
in such activities is the best way to lose all grips on what the
situation calls for. Such an experience of spontaneous immersion
or absorption “into the world of objects” only arises precisely
when we are not looking for them; conversely, they would vanish
immediately insofar I would try to think or believe them. Yet,
pace Dennett, this does not mean that in those instances I
momentarily become a zombie or unconscious machine; there
still is something ‘it is like’ to be absorbed in these activities which
set them apart from, say, a comatose condition, and the absence
of belief is one example of its constitutive features. It is precisely
this ‘internally excluded’ character of belief and experience in
such phenomena which Dennett’s doxastic Cartesianism cannot
countenance.
DENNETT AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE
CURIOUS CASE OF THE “OBJECTIVELY
SUBJECTIVE”
Before we can begin to specify in what way psychoanalytic theory
could bear on this debate between Dennett and phenomenology,
some precursory remarks are in order. Because, first of all, it
might not be entirely clear where, if at all, we should situate
psychoanalysis, whether in its original Freudian formulation or
in its Lacanian version, along Sellars’ somewhat contrived, but
perhaps still hermeneutically useful dichotomy. For in contrast to
phenomenology’s straightforward and programmatic insistence
on first-person experience as an indispensable datum for any sort
of naturalism, the claims and subject matter of psychoanalytic
theory are in this regard, to put it mildly, somewhat more
ambiguous. Of course, it might be argued that psychoanalysis
is not really that interested in, nor in itself capable of, pursuing
or resisting the naturalistic agenda of bridging the gap between
neurocognitive and phenomenological accounts of blind sight
or the rubber-hand illusion. And indeed, one could say, what
would be further removed from psychoanalysis’ basic insight into
man’s constitutive disadapted relation to its ‘natural’ environment
than Dennett’s talk of the design stance? Yet such a first and
perhaps heartening impression is easily discarded when we shift
the terrain to those phenomena, however, ill designed, that
are considered to be at least more amenable to psychoanalytic
elucidation, such as the nature of psychopathology, sexuality,
language or desire. With regard to those, the question emerges
whether or not psychoanalysis would simply join in with
Dennett’s deflationary tactics of reducing the several issues
that may arise in the effort of articulating the intertwinement
of subjectivity and language – for example, the relation a
subject entertains with its own speech – or subjectivity and
desire – for example, what it means to desire the desire of
the other – to the austere categories of ‘seeming’ or ‘fiction’?
Presumably, the pre-reflexive answer would consist in a quick and
resounding ‘no’.
However, on the other hand, given Freud’s departure from
Brentano’s views on intentionality and self-consciousness (see
Seron, 2015, pp. 15–30; Bernet, 2002) or Lacan’s critique of
both Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis (Lacan, 2006, p. 80)
and Merleau-Ponty’s bodily unconscious (Lacan, 1982−1983,
p. 75), it is equally clear that the intellectual relation between
phenomenology and psychoanalysis is complicated enough
to avoid any easy wedding of psychoanalysis with manifest
experience. Given this ambiguous position, a clarification of how
psychoanalysis relates to the ongoing ‘scientific disenchantment’
along the terms set by Dennett’s ingenious codification of the
claims and methods of cognitive science, and conversely, to the
phenomenological arguments that are being advanced against
Dennett’s proposal, indeed becomes a reasonable task.
Freud and Lacan between
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
To begin with some sweeping examples: what exactly is left of
the once so seductive Freudian image of the three successive
humiliations of man-in-the-world (Copernicus-Darwin-Freud)
now that we can safely add a fourth one, -Dennett? As noted
by several commentators (Gardner, 2000; Zizek, 2006), it seems
that Freudian psychoanalysis, steeped as it is in the intentional
language of repression, desires and negation – now finds itself
amongst those traditional ‘manifest’ philosophies threatened by
the more recent neurocognitive humiliations. And the reason for
this clear: though, in the felicitous wordings of Freud, “psyche is
extended; knows nothing about it” (Freud, 1938b, p. 300), there
has never been a lack of critics pointing out that what it does not
know is still suspiciously close to the philosophical problematic
of intentional consciousness. And it is indeed striking and ironic,
given psychoanalysis’ original declaration of independence from
any philosophy issuing from the cogito (see Freud, 1923, p. 13;
Lacan, 2006, p. 75), that one of the standard ways of defending
the unconscious today is precisely by referring to the properties of
consciousness, of which intentionality is held to be pre-eminent.
As Freud (1915) himself indeed pointed out:
All the categories which we employ to describe conscious
mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions, and so on,
can be applied [to unconscious mental acts]. Indeed, we are
obliged to say of some of these latent states that the only respect
in which they differ from conscious ones is precisely in the
absence of consciousness (p. 168).
Turning to Lacan, we can discern the same manifest motives
despite the latter’s proto-cognitivist, structuralistic inclinations:
even on the most cursory reading of the Ecrits, it would
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be difficult to avoid the perennial ‘philosophemes’ of subject,
alienation, desire, Other and so on. But Lacan, of course,
would try to avoid any quick philosophical (mis)recognition by
reminding his readers to this subject is split, barred and divided
by the signifier, therefore not the phenomenological subject of
Jemeinigkeit, always already conscious of itself in its intentional
involvement with the world. Nevertheless, however, split or
deferred this subject might be, this failed or misfired cogito is still
close enough to its Cartesian predecessor so as not to completely
break with it. On the contrary, Lacan only ever wanted to think
the unconscious, not as antithetical to consciousness, not as “a
species that defines a circle in psychical reality of what does not
have the attribute of consciousness” (Lacan, 2006, p. 830), but
precisely as the implicit truth already contained in the Cartesian
cogito me cogitare (see Dolar, 1998; Lacan, 2006). But this also
means that this truth, whatever else it may be, is the truth of
that same old Cogito, gained through a certain radicalization of
that traditional aporia, confronted differently by Husserl, Fichte
or Sartre, of conceiving subjectivity from and within its own
terms. Therefore, in so far as phenomenology is susceptible to
Dennett’s heterophenomenological recasting of subjectivity in
terms of a ‘theorist’s fiction’, the same holds for Lacan’s particular
defense of the subject. And is it indeed not quite imaginable,
for example, that Dennett’s response to Lacan’s notorious anti-
humanistic formula in Science and Truth according to which
“science’s man does not exist, only it’s subject does” (2006, p. 730)
would be the sobering “nor does it’s subject, although it might
seem to”?
On the other hand, however, it could be pointed out that we
might have proceeded a little bit too quickly and carelessly in
lumping together psychoanalysis with the manifest philosophies
of intentional experience. And in fact, as is well known, both
Freud and Lacan have been taken to task for neglecting and
underestimating the accomplishments of phenomenology in a
way that is, although not strictly equivalent, remarkably close to
the contemporary phenomenological arguments raised against
Dennett (see Schafer, 1976; Chalmers, 1995). Suffice to recall,
in Freud’s case, the succinct phenomenological critique of the
psychoanalytic unconscious by Eugen Fink in the appendix to
Husserl’s Crisis:
This objection, which is raised in many variations against
the so-called ‘consciousness-idealism of phenomenology,’ is
based on a fundamental philosophical naïveté. [. . .] The
naïveté we refer to consists, before all theory-construction
about the unconscious, in an omission. One thinks one is
already acquainted with what the ‘conscious’, or consciousness’,
is and dismisses the task of first making into a prior
subject matter the concept against which any science of the
unconscious must demarcate its subject matter, i.e., precisely
that of consciousness. But because one does not know what
consciousness is, one misses in principle the point of departure
of a science of the ‘unconscious’ (Husserl, 1970, p. 386).
Despite the shifting terminology, it’s not too difficult to
recognize in this depiction of psychoanalysis’ ‘naïveté’ the
same point of contention we already encountered in Dennett’s
case. That is, Freud is held to have tried to develop a
naturalistic third-personal theory of mental functioning, couched
in broadly functionalistic-energetic terms (the dynamic trinity
of ‘ego’, ‘id’ and ‘superego’; the energetic metaphors of cathexis,
displacement, condensation, and so on), destined to explain
various pathological phenomena, without, however, offering any
explicit and sustained consideration of ‘consciousness’. As noted
by Tugendhat (1986, pp. 131–132) and Ricoeur (1977, p. 420
et passim.), Freud indeed never seems to talk about phenomenal
consciousness and self-consciousness directly, but only and
rather loosely in terms of the ‘ego’ which is portrayed as yet
another homuncular-functional entity amongst others. A similar
story can be told with regard to the notion of repression and
other ‘mechanisms’ of defense of which Freud gives an extended
account in terms of word- and thing-presentations, cathexes and
so on, again strongly suggesting that these concepts designate
sub-personal operations of some kind. Accordingly, repression,
displacement, condensation and other similar notions, should
not be conceived as first-personal actions, whether conscious
or unconscious, operating within a normative framework of
beliefs and desires, but as functionally specifiable processes
requiring no agents, experiencers or observers whatsoever. In
short: on this reading, psychoanalytic theory turns out to share
roughly the same agenda as cognitive neuroscience in trying to
offer a homuncular-functionalist top-down analysis of mental
functioning in terms of various subsystems until we reach the
level of non-intelligent functionaries that can be replaced by a
machine (see Freud, 1938a, p. 144).
As for Lacan, although one of the remarkable features of his
self-proclaimed return to Freudian orthodoxy is precisely the
explicit avoidance of all those orthodox-naturalistic elements, this
didn’t necessarily seem to imply a return to a consideration of
l’expérience vécue at the expense of Freud’s naturalism. On the
contrary, Lacan’s structuralist-materialist reworking of Freudian
metapsychology in terms of his ‘logic of the signifier’ appears
to have been driven by an even more fierce ambition to finally
establish psychoanalysis as a rigorous, because aspiring to the
Koyréan ideal of mathematical formalization, scientific endeavor
(see Milner, 1995; Johnston, 2012; Tomšic,, 2012). And indeed,
after some years of flirting with phenomenological accounts, the
famous 1953 Discourse of Rome can be seen as a veritable trumpet
blast fiercely announcing the new footings on which to resurrect
the psychoanalytic edifice as a “science of subjectivity” (Lacan,
2006, p. 235):
The form of mathematicization in which the discovery of the
phoneme is inscribed, as a function of pairs of oppositions
formed by the smallest graspable discriminative semantic
elements, leads us to the very foundations that Freud’s final
doctrine designates as the subjective sources of the symbolic
function in a vocalic connotation of presence and absence. And
the reduction of any language (langue) to a group comprised
of a very small number of such phonemic oppositions,
initiating an equally rigorous formalization of its highest-level
morphemes, puts within our reach a strict approach to our own
field (Lacan, 2006, pp. 235–236).
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This is indeed a far cry from Lacan’s earlier phenomenological
declaration that “language, prior to signifying something,
signifies to someone” (2006, p. 66). Here we are incited to the
view that language, loosely defined in terms of the symbolic order
as somehow pertaining to both the regulatory principles of social
exchange and the material-phonetic level of ‘pure signifiers’ (on
this equivocation, see Descombes, 2009), is “a form in which
the subject is inserted at the level of his being” (Lacan, 1993,
p. 179). In the Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” and The
Instance of the Letter, gloomy images are being invoked to convey
the radical nature of this ‘insertion’. Lacan (2006, p. 21)) talks
about “machines-that-think-like-men, subjects “more docile than
sheep”, lined up before the gripping effect of the signifying chain
as “ostriches”, determined by the signifier’s displacement in their
“acts, destiny, refusals, blindnesses, success, and fate.” How all
of this is supposed to be an effect of ‘symbolic determination’ is
never really convincingly spelled out (Dennett’s anti-mysterian
concept of “wonder tissue” might be put to good use here;
see Dennett, 2013, pp. 198–205), nor is it clear if and in what
way Lacan’s structuralistic remolding of Freudian concepts (e.g.,
metaphor/metonymy for condensation/displacement, repetition
of the signifying chain for Wiederholungszwang, . . .) is really an
advance compared to the latter. Yet, for our present purposes, at
least it is clear that on this reading Lacan’s intent was to purify the
Freudian unconscious even further from any remaining residues
of metaphysical humanism and its associated anthropomorphic
terminology. Hence, as we have noted in the case of Freud,
Lacan’s structuralistic rearticulation of the unconscious could
therefore equally well be seen as a forerunner to the sort of
materialist program better known today under the heading of
cognitive science (see also Dupuy, 2000).
Psychoanalysis’ “Abominable Mess”
Now this Janus-faced character of psychoanalysis has of course
never slipped the attention of its various commentators,
provoking blame and rejection from its critics; praise, confusion
or silent endorsement from its defenders. On Sartre’s diagnosis,
for example, psychoanalysis is precisely founded on a systematic
confusion of the personal and sub-personal levels and this
constitutes its unavoidable yet inadmissible paradox: “I
both am and am not the psychic facts hypothesized by
psychoanalysis” (Sartre, 1958, pp. 50–51). In roughly the
same way, Wittgenstein famously spoke of psychoanalysis’
“abominable mess” (Wittgenstein, 1978, p. 316), premised as it is
on a confusion between first-personal reasons and third-personal
causes, imposing the former even if the patient doesn’t accept
them, resorting to the latter and being content with the patient’s
acceptance for their justification (Cioffi, 1998).
Similar accusations apply to Lacan’s ‘materialism of the
signifier’, as representing yet another confused effort to straddle
both sides of this fence at once: the signifier being regarded
as both amenable to a ‘materialist’ description in terms of its
meaningless phonemic properties and an ‘idealist’ description in
terms of its meaningful semantic properties. By cutting the cord
between signifier and signified, and in the same move declaring
the primacy of the former over the latter, Lacan thought to be able
to transmute these ‘pure signifiers’ into causal forces operating
in a mechanical way, yet responsible for the different meaning
effects encountered in psychoanalytic practice. This is, for some,
the very formula of magic (see Descombes, 2001, p. 93–101).
So what then are we to make of this confusion? There
are of course some well-tried reconciliatory attempts which
basically consist in either translating psychoanalysis into
phenomenological terms2, or, embracing it precisely as a form
of sub-personal psychology3 (see Gardner, 2000 for a detailed
discussion), yet perhaps the more interesting thing to notice is the
recurrent image from which such solutions spontaneously spring.
By this we mean, as regards the present discussion, the very form
in which the difference between Dennett and phenomenology is
formulated: that is, in terms of ‘fictional beliefs’ (Dennett) and
‘manifest experience’ (phenomenology). In the following section,
we will therefore try to explicate in what way psychoanalytic
theory could distinguish itself from both these readings.
Decentering Appearance: Belief in Belief
Let us begin this section by recapitulating in a condensed
form the core disagreement which stands behind the discussion
between Dennett and phenomenology. Whether it is the topic
of perceptual consciousness, imagination, sense of agency, the
painfulness of pain or the problem of other minds, is not really
that essential here: the crucial divergence already appears at the
level of “the organization of the data” (Dennett, 2003, p. 9), that
is, the way in which researchers should proceed whenever they set
out to explain those phenomena of consciousness.
In his Who’s on First? (2003), Dennett offers a clear summary
of his position that can put the problem in sharper focus.
“What”, Dennett asks, are the “primary data” from which we
ought to depart in order to arrive at “a science of consciousness”
(p. 21), i.e.: (a) conscious experiences themselves; (b) beliefs
about these experiences; (c) verbal judgments expressing those
beliefs; or (d) utterances of one sort or another? Whereas, as
we have seen, phenomenology vigorously opts for (a); Dennett’s
heterophenomenology is premised on the elimination of (a) in
favor of (b) and (c). From this disagreement, it necessarily follows
that the philosophical concepts of ‘appearance’ and ‘seeming’
function as a kind of shibboleth in the ensuing debate: designating
‘immediate experience’ in the case of phenomenology, ‘beliefs
about experience’ in Dennett’s account. Furthermore, it becomes
obvious why the way in which arguments are being pressed for
one position or the other, take on the form in which we have
argued for some of the claims found in phenomenology: i.e.,
those cases that point toward a disjunction between belief and
experience – that is, on the one hand, ‘beliefs without experience’
as in the discussion about the level of detail found in visual
consciousness; on the other hand, ‘experience without belief ’ as
in Sartre’s example of ‘pre-reflexive immersion’.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, however, what should
immediately strike us is not so much this manifest level
2This is indeed the proposal we can read in the works of Sartre and – even
earlier – Politzer: to release psychoanalysis from its “mechanistic cramp” (Sartre,
1979, p. 32) or “abstract” and “realist” exigencies (Politzer, 1994) – for an excellent
overview of Politzer’s somewhat forgotten critique, see Bianco (2016).
3For a defense of this reading, see, e.g., Moore (1988); Kitcher (1992) and
Livingstone-Smith (1999).
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of disagreement in terms of the difference between ‘belief ’
and ‘experience’, but rather the implicit Cartesian agreement
between Dennett and phenomenology on the concept of
belief itself. To put it in Spinozistic terms, there is still,
however, slightly, something sticking out as ‘a kingdom within
a kingdom’ throughout this whole discussion, something
which becomes most explicit in Dennett’s response to some
of his critics – Schwitzgebel (2007) and Noë (2007) – in
his Heterophenomenology Reconsidered (2007). As before, the
critique involves Dennett’s seemingly incompatible insistence on
both the essential fallibility of first-person accounts and some
kind of Rortian incorrigibility with regard to “how it seems
to them” (p. 263). In the same volume, Noë (2007) evokes
the familiar Wittgensteinian theme on the logical limits of
justification of first-person accounts which comes to an end
rather sooner than we might think:
It [Wittgenstein’s view on justification] applies to the special
case where what is in question is how I take my own experience
to be, what I take it to be like. I can be mistaken about the
nature of my experience – about how I, in experience, take
things to be. [. . .] But it would be a different kind of mistake
for me also to be mistaken about how I take my experience to
be. I can be wrong then about how things seem but not wrong
about how I take things to seem (p. 244).
Dennett (2007) wholeheartedly agrees:
If somebody says her visual field seems detailed all the way
out to the periphery, which lacks a perceptible boundary, there
is no gainsaying her claim, but if she goes on to theorize
about “the background” [. . .], she becomes an entirely fallible
theorist, no longer to be taken at her word (p. 263).
So, at least when it comes to this notion of ‘taking’, of what
I believe my experience ‘is like’, phenomenology and Dennett
prove themselves to be something like an “epistemological pair”
(Bachelard, 1949, p. 5). In short: whereas we can be wrong
about ‘seeming’ understood in terms of experience, we cannot,
however, be wrong about ‘seeming’ in terms of belief. Now the
proper psychoanalytic questions that should arise in this context
are the following ones: whence this sudden confidence? Which
arguments are being advanced here to uphold this last inviolable
sanctum of minimal infallibility with regard to this Cartesian
theme of ‘belief in belief ’? Why is it so obvious that ‘immunity
to error’ immediately ensues whenever we shift the terrain to the
topic of belief itself? Is it because, in this case, the well-known
phenomenological figure of the ‘unbeteiligte Zuschauer’ suddenly
reappears on the scene? If so, why would that be? And why
precisely at this point? Surprisingly, precious little can be found
on these questions when we consult these various commentators.
Nevertheless, here, as everywhere else, it could be wise to
stick to Althusser’s famous “golden rule of materialism” to
“not judge a being by its self-consciousness (Althusser, 1996,
p. 115). Particularly interesting in this context are the analyses
we can find in the works of Zizek (1998, 2006, 2014) and
Pfaller (2014, 2015) on the psychoanalytic concept of ‘belief ’.
Elaborating on and extending Octave Mannoni’s perspicuous
theory of fetishism (see Mannoni, 2003, pp. 68–92), both these
authors have drawn attention to a series of entirely common
phenomena which nevertheless share some striking features that
are directly relevant for our overall discussion. To start with some
of these examples:
Imagine you’re sitting in a bar reading a newspaper, waiting for
a friend. The friend arrives. He says hello, and then continues:
‘Excuse me, can I have a quick look at your newspaper? I know
it’s silly, but I just have to know the score from yesterday’s game’
(Pfaller, 2014, p. 1).
For reasons that are no doubt suspect, but hidden, I sometimes
read the rather rudimentary horoscopes published in certain
papers. It seems to me that I do not take much of an interest
in them. I wonder how people can believe in them. [. . .]
Once, last year, my horoscope said that “tomorrow will be an
extremely favorable day for tidying up the house.” This was not
a spectacular prediction, except that I had long been planning
to move on the day in question. I burst out laughing at so funny
a coincidence. [. . .] I could say that I am not superstitious
because I pay no mind to such things. But, to be precise, I
should rather say: I know quite well that coincidences of this
kind are meaningless, but I take a certain amount of pleasure
in them all the same (Mannoni, 2003, p. 78).
What is common to these examples – and numerous others
(see Zizek (1998); Pfaller (2014), for an extensive collection) –
is the paradoxical relation a subject seems to entertain with
its belief (i.e., the importance of sports; the significance of
horoscope predictions). In a way that is difficult to render
conceptually transparent, these sorts of beliefs are never really
believed in (“I know it’s silly” – “I know quite well that these
coincidences are meaningless”), yet in one way or another, they
nonetheless exert a particular influence on their subjects (the
compulsion to look at the paper – the pleasurable laughter).
Moreover, as Pfaller argues, it is not so much their content
that is primarily of interest here, but rather the form in
which people refer to these beliefs. That is, as was already
apparent from Mannoni’s formula for these types of beliefs (“I
know quite well . . . but still”), its form is characterized by
a complex coexistence of ‘better knowledge’ and ‘belief ’. The
fidget sports fanatic knows quite well that yesterday’s results
are not important, but still he has to see them. Despite the
better knowledge, and despite the gap this places between him
and his silly practice, he nevertheless acts as if sports are
of utmost importance. Similarly, horoscope predictions seem
rather ridiculous to Mannoni, nonetheless, as he admits: “if
the horoscope had said that “tomorrow will be an extremely
unfavorable day for moving”, “it would have made me laugh
differently” (2003, p. 78.).
So in an initial approximation of the formal structure of
this phenomenon, one should say that, on the one hand, these
are beliefs that are never really one’s own beliefs in the sense
that one would claim ownership over them (à la “I believe in
horoscopes, I really do”). The “better knowledge” is immediately
invoked to signal such a subjective position of transcendence
toward the belief. Yet, different from, for example, the Sartrean
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formula for transcendence – i.e., “To believe is to know that one
believes, and to know that one believes is no longer to believe”
(Sartre, 1958, p. 114) – such a better knowledge seems to be of
little avail with respect to the efficacy of the belief in question.
On the contrary, as Mannoni points out, one should even
wonder if this position of knowledgeable transcendence does
not somehow contribute to the maintenance of the disavowed
belief? Such a claim would immediately contradict the seemingly
incontestable principle according to which the dialectical relation
between ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief ’ is grounded in exclusion: on
such an account, we (erroneously) believe (in the importance
of sports, in the predictive validity of horoscopes, . . .) precisely
because we do not know (that sports are not important, that
horoscopes do not possess predictive value, . . .); conversely,
better knowledge cancels out what we previously believed. Here,
on the contrary, the dialectical relation between knowledge and
belief would be based on the principle of necessary conjunction:
only on the condition of better knowledge are we susceptible
to those beliefs; conversely, in the absence of better knowledge,
believing becomes impossible – as Mannoni succinctly puts it:
“Evidently, the sole reason for the “but all the same” is the “I
know well”” (2003, p. 71). If this principle is somehow sustainable
(cf. infra for further argumentation), we can now proceed to
advance a more precise formulation of this dialectic in terms
of our general discussion: on a psychoanalytic account, the way
things appear to me, that is, of what I “objectively believe”
(cf. Zizek, 1989, p. 35) – as evidenced, despite myself, in my
nonsensical behavior, spontaneous reactions and utterances (e.g.,
encouraging my car by means of little compliments when it won’t
start, wearing my ‘lucky shirt’ for an important interview which I
did prepare for in a ‘professional’ way, . . . ) – as opposed to what
I believe to believe, is structurally dependent on the self-reflexive
movement of intellectual distancing through ‘knowing that one
knows’.
Belief in the Uncanny or Uncanny Belief?
Now, in order to substantiate this rather strong claim, what we
seem to need is a methodological procedure closely resembling
the phenomenological tool of “eidetic variation” (see Husserl,
1977, sec. 9a) in and through which, formally speaking, the
necessary conditions of a certain phenomenon are established by
‘varying’ those conditions up to the point where the phenomenon
itself would become (in)conceivable. Now it happens that a
procedure of this kind is to be found implicitly in Freud’s 1919
treatise on The Uncanny, a phenomenon which, moreover, bears
some striking resemblances to the examples discussed above
(see Dolar, 1991; Zupancic, 2005; Pfaller, 2006). Regardless of
the wealth of literary examples and psychoanalytic concepts
Freud employs throughout the article, this dense and, to a
certain extent, inconclusive text, essentially revolves around one
central effort: to circumscribe the “common core” which would
allow us “to distinguish as ‘uncanny’ certain things which lie
within the field of what is frightening” (Freud, 1919, p. 219).
Freud’s question is: how should one proceed in defining the
common denominator in such a variety of examples as the
mechanical doll Olympia, the obscene figure of the Sand-
Man, the recurrent theme of the “double”, the “repetition
factor” or the Rat Man’s “omnipotence of thoughts” – all taken
as typical instances of the uncanny (Freud, 1919)? Why are
they not simple examples of garden variety phobias such as
the fear of heights or crowded places? What is it that sets
them apart from the more epistemologically innocent logic of
cognitive surprise or unfulfilled anticipation? And, finally, why
should they even produce this peculiar affective response rather
than none at all? As an instructive introduction for a further
demarcation of the problem, Freud offers the following, general
formula:
[. . .] an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the
distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when
something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears
before us in reality [. . .] (1919, p. 242).
Accordingly, we seem to have three relevant conditions –
(1) the uncanny affect; (2) imagination; (3) appearance. First,
the feeling of uncanniness should be distinguished from more
common affective responses such as surprise, fear or mere
indifference. Nor is it merely the univocal opposite of what
is familiar, in the sense of ‘homely’, ‘cozy’ or ‘intimate’, since
not everything which entails a negation of the familiar in this
sense will provoke the feeling of the uncanny. As Freud argues,
“something has to be added to what is novel and unfamiliar in
order to make it uncanny” (1919, p. 221). Secondly, what it is
that should be added seems to be contained in the two other
conditions: appearance and imagination. Freud illustrates this
point with an example taken from his case study of the Rat Man:
In the case history of an obsessional neurotic, I have described
how the patient once stayed in a hydropathic establishment
and benefited greatly by it. He had the good sense, however, to
attribute his improvement not to the therapeutic properties of
the water, but to the situation of his room, which immediately
adjoined that of a very accommodating nurse. So on his second
visit to the establishment he asked for the same room, but
was told that it was already occupied by an old gentleman,
whereupon he gave vent to his annoyance in the words: ‘I
wish he may be struck dead for it’. A fortnight later the old
gentleman really did have a stroke. My patient thought this an
‘uncanny’ experience (1919, p. 239).
Here we have all the conditions combined: (1) the uncanny
fearful experience, (2) the imagination pertaining to the obsessive
wish and (3) reality appearing as if it immediately responded
to what was “hitherto regarded as imaginary” (Freud, 1919,
p. 242). At this point we can also introduce our previous
dialectic between ‘better knowledge’ and ‘belief ’. Freud’s first
decisive move is to exclude Jentsch’s hypothesis of intellectual
uncertainty as an essential factor for the production of the Rat
Man’s uncanny experience and seemingly absurd guilt feelings.
On such a cognitive account, the Rat Man would be struck
by the uncanny precisely because he was, for a brief moment,
a spontaneous theoretician of the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’,
intellectually unable to rid himself from the illusion that ‘wishes
can truly kill’. And the reason for this is precisely because
reality appears to correspond with was held to be impossible:
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better knowledge is suspended because of the qualities of the
appearance. Conversely, lifting the veil of appearances would
mean to break the spell of the uncanny. However, not only
would this idea square rather badly with another of Freud’s (1909,
p.229) remarks on the peculiar epistemic position of the Rat
Man as being different from “the superstition of uneducated
people who feel themselves at one with their belief,” it would
also mean that, in the case of Hoffman’s story, our uncanny
experience would be due as well to our intellectual uncertainty as
regards the true status of the Sand-Man. Yet, as Freud remarks,
the story makes it quite clear that the Sand-Man is not really
the Sand-man, nevertheless, “this knowledge does not lessen the
impression of uncanniness in the least degree” (1919, p. 230).
Furthermore, it can even be said that the logic of the uncanny
is directly opposed to the logic of intellectual uncertainty. As
Dolar (1991) points out, the most uncanny thing is not so
much that we are kept uncertain as to the true nature of events,
whether or not what happens is really due some unfathomable
scenario. On the contrary, what is uncanny is that one knows
in advance precisely what is bound to happen, even how and
when it will happen . . . and then, effectively, it really does
happen. So here we seem to have attained a first step toward
establishing our thesis: the uncanny is an experience that is
not altered by a transcendent position of ‘better knowledge’.
The Rat Man knows quite well that ‘wishes can’t kill’, that
these absurd coincidences mean nothing at all, nonetheless, he
is plagued by uncanny feelings and a mythical guilt strangely
proportional to a disavowed belief in ‘the omnipotence of
thoughts’.
Now the second part of Mannoni’s formula arises: could
it be that the uncanny is not only impervious to ‘better
knowledge’, but more strongly, that the latter should be seen as
its enabling condition? This would mean that in the absence
of better knowledge, whenever the distance between myself
and the suspended belief disappears, the phenomenon of the
uncanny would disappear as well. Again, Freud has noted this
point in his subsequent effort, later on in the text, to shift the
emphasis from his earlier material definition of the uncanny in
terms of the content of the appearance, to a formal definition
in terms of the subjective position of those aﬄicted by the
uncanny toward that very same content. Why, for instance,
would the prompt fulfillment of Polycrates’ wishes induce an
uncanny effect, while the very same appearance of immediate
wish-fulfillment in the story of The Three Wishes produces none
at all? Or whence the uncanniness surrounding the living doll
Olympia in Hoffman’s story, while again the same theme of
coming-to-life of inanimate objects in most fairy tale stories
remains without effect? If it is not the content of the appearance
as such that seems to be responsible for the uncanny feeling
when reading those stories, then, as Freud argues, we should
consider the subjective position from which such stories are
read (1919, pp. 245–246). What sets apart, for example, the
aesthetic of Hoffman’s story from that of fairy tales is that in
the former, at the outset, we are invited to adopt the natural
attitude of everyday life. Within this attitude, we know that such
figures as the eye-robbing Sand-Man do not exist. In fairy tales,
however,
[. . .] the world of reality is left behind from the very
start, and the animistic system of beliefs is frankly adopted.
Wish-fulfillments, secret powers, omnipotence of thoughts,
animation of inanimate objects, all the elements so common in
fairy stories, can exert no uncanny influence here [. . .] (Freud,
1919, p. 250).
Here, precisely, in the enchanted world of fairy tales where
the existence of ghosts, resurrection of the dead, miracles and
other gruesome plots is assumed, we have nothing to fear.
And we have nothing to fear precisely because the difference
between better knowledge and belief is temporarily suspended.
On the other hand, only if we are invited to the enlightened
position of better knowledge, only if we know that wishes are
not causally responsible for certain outcomes in the world, do
we spontaneously react to those outcomes as if we believed that
things could have been different. Similarly, precisely because
the Rat Man was “a highly educated and enlightened man of
considerable acumen” and therefore “did not believe a word
of all this rubbish” (1909, p. 229), did he react with a strange
and compulsory form of credulity in the face of the most
trivial coincidences. Hence, as Freud aptly notes, we must have
“surmounted” certain beliefs in order to be susceptible to the
effects of the uncanny (1919, p. 247).
CONCLUSION
To conclude our article, we will note three points that are
particularly relevant for our discussion. First, as was the case in
the examples discussed earlier, the logic of the uncanny should
be understood in terms of a complex dialectic between better
knowledge and belief. Within this dialectic, better knowledge
does not form the disjunctive counterpart to belief, but should
itself be considered as but one necessary element situated on the
same “plane of immanence” (Deleuze, 2005) in conjunction with
belief (see also Pfaller, 2014, pp. 41–43). Starting from this general
principle, psychoanalytic theory therefore argues for at least two
critical points: first, pace Dennett and phenomenology, we do not
always know what we believe or how things seem to us; second,
we misrecognize the true function of the alleged distance toward
the belief that is expressed through “knowing better” (see Zizek,
1989, pp. 32–33; Pfaller, 2005, p. 118).
Second, this idea also enables us to put forward a further,
finer distinction between psychoanalytic theory and the
aforementioned phenomenological principle of ‘appearance qua
appearance’ (cf. supra). According to this principle, beliefs are
explained by the properties of the apparent object. Because reality
appears in such a way as if, for example, it corresponds to the
immediate fulfillment of my wishes, I (wrongly) believe that
it does. Psychoanalytic theory, however, significantly departs
from this picture: if, for instance, the uncanny appears uncanny
and I strangely react, despite better knowledge, as if I believed
in ‘the omnipotence of thoughts’, then this suspended belief
is not primarily due to the properties of the presented object,
but first of all to the act of presentation. More precisely: on a
psychoanalytic account, the uncanny is uncanny not because I
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confuse appearance with reality, not because I succumb to the
illusion and naively follow the appearance, but, on the contrary,
precisely because I do not follow the appearance, because I am
able to recognize the illusion as an illusion (or at least believe I
can) and therefore picture myself as occupying a transcendent
position of better knowledge. In short: exactly when – to put
it in Husserlian terms – I do not confuse properties of what is
represented with the act of representing. The illusion, therefore,
is not situated at the level of the object, nor is it situated at the
level of judgment toward that object, but in how this very act of
judgment, and the reflexive self-consciousness of that judgment,
contributes to what I ‘objectively believe’.
Third and finally, this notion of ‘objective belief ’ – i.e., beliefs
that are suspended by ‘better knowledge’ – further allows us to
confront in a distinctive way what may be considered as the
defining gesture of Dennett’s heterophenomenology: the rejection
of “the bizarre category of the objectively subjective” (Dennett,
1991, p. 132). According to Dennett, this obscure philosophical
notion of the “objectively subjective” should be disposed of
because it is once again a clear expression of our obstinate
belief in the Cartesian theater. It would correspond to that
mythical moment of pure phenomenological ‘givenness’, where
the ‘given’ is ‘given’ before being ‘taken’ in one way or another,
in a theoretically unencumbered place where consciousness
really happens. As Dennett notes, such a place might be a
comforting image for some philosophers because it preserves
the traditional distinction between reality and appearance at the
heart of human subjectivity, “the seeming-a-certain-way over
and above a believing-that-it-is-that-way” (1991, p. 133). Yet,
the examples we discussed point out that this is perhaps not
the only way in which “the objectively subjective” can be read.
Indeed, instead of believing in “appearances” and not knowing
whether or not they correspond to reality, “objective beliefs”
display exactly the opposite structure: we know that they are
not true, perhaps we even have a thoroughly adequate picture
of reality, but the fact that we are nonetheless defined by them,
that we act on them, remains undetected (Pfaller, 2014). Hence,
from a psychoanalytic view, it is not so much the illusion of the
“Cartesian theater”, but the Dennettian theme of “belief in belief”
considered as an exhaustive account of subjectivity that should be
questioned.
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